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Abstract
We examine two alternative group decision mechanisms in a standard quasi-linear environment: a sim-
ple one-stage bidding mechanism and a multi-stage bidding mechanism. First, we show that the simple
one-stage bidding mechanism works only in limited situations and may fail to realize an efﬁcient social
alternative. Then, we alternatively propose a multi-stage mechanism and show that there always exists a
subgame perfect equilibrium in our multi-stage bidding mechanism, i.e. it does always work, and also that
in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the mechanism a socially efﬁcient alternative is realized.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72; D71
Keywords: Bidding mechanism; Social choice; Implementation
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1 Introduction
In the recent literature on cooperative game theory, the bidding-based mechanisms where individuals si-
multaneously reveal their willingness to pay to each of the other individuals have been intensively explored
to implement cooperative solutions in the cost/surplus-sharing problems. In the pioneering work of Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein [7], they formulated the mechanism involving a bidding stage where each individual
is required to reveal a payable bid to each of the other individuals in exchange for obtaining the right to
be a proposer in the subsequent stages, and they showed that in its subgame perfect equilibrium the Shap-
ley value is realized as the ﬁnal payoff to each individual. Vidal-Puga and Bergantin˜os [11] examined
the extension of the mechanism considered in [7] and succeeded in implementing the Owen value. The
bidding-based mechanism is also considered in the paper of Mutuswami et al. [5] in the context of a local
public goods provision and in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [9] in the context of an efﬁcient network for-
mation, respectively. In each of the papers [5] and [9], it has been shown that their mechanism realizes the
Shapley value as the equilibrium payoff in an appropriately deﬁned cooperative game. Macho-Stadler et
al. [2] considered the case where the surplus generated by individuals’ cooperation partly depends on the
externality by the individuals who does not participate in the cooperation. They devised two mechanism,
one for each case of positive externality or negative one, and showed that the payoffs in the subgame perfect
equilibrium of each of the mechanisms coincide with the extension of the Shapley value formulated by the
average approach established in their companion paper [3]. Finally, in the recent paper of Slikker [10],
the bidding mechanism is applied to implement network allocation rules such as the Myerson value, the
position value, and the component-wise egalitarian solution.
The purpose of this paper is to examine possible applications of the bidding-based mechanism in the
context of collective choice problem of social alternatives. Examples include a location of a public facility
such as a public school, a disposal center, and a nuclear-related facility. We consider a standard quasi-linear
environment with ﬁnite social alternatives each of which affects all of individuals in a society. The two
companion papers of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [6, 7] are the ﬁrst to address such a collective choice
problem. In their papers, they analyzed how to choose a single alternative among all the individuals’ most
favorite ones. They formulated a one-stage bidding mechanism and proved that their mechanism always
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realizes the most efﬁcient alternative among all the individuals’ proposals. In the present paper, we consider
a slightly generalized group decision problem. We consider the case where the feasible social alternatives
are not restricted to the individuals’ most favorite ones. In a quasi-linear environment, the concept of
efﬁciency can be given as the maximization of sum of individuals’ utilities generated by the alternative.
Therefore, assuming that the individuals are self-regarding utility maximizers, there is no guarantee that
the individuals’ most favorite alternatives are socially efﬁcient ones, and it will be the case that there is an
alternative that none of the individuals most prefers but in which the highest total utility is achieved. In this
paper, we examine two alternative bidding mechanisms to realize a socially efﬁcient alternative: one is a
simple one-stage mechanism, and the other is a multi-stage mechanism.
In Section 2, we ﬁrst examine a simple one-stage bidding mechanism. In our one-stage mechanism,
each individual is asked to make her/his bid to each of the other individuals, and one individual, called a
proposer, is chosen based on the bids and s/he obtains the right to determine which of the alternatives will
be realized in the society. The proposer is determined in the following way. For each individual, the net
bid is calculated as the sum of her/his bids to the other individuals minus the sum of the bids by the other
individuals to her/him. Then, the individual with the highest net bid becomes the proposer (if there exist
more than one, then randomly chosen). Our ﬁrst main result is that this simple mechanism works only in
limited situations where the individuals’ most favorite alternatives generate the same sums of individuals’
utilities. Moreover, even in the cases where the mechanism can successfully work, it may fail to realize
socially efﬁcient alternative as an equilibrium outcome.
In order to realize a socially efﬁcient alternative, we examine an alternative bidding mechanism in
Section 3. We modify the simple one-stage mechanism in Section 2 and formulate a three-stage mechanism.
The ﬁrst stage of the mechanism is the same as in the one-stage mechanism. In contrast to the one-stage
mechanism, after a proposer is determined, the modiﬁed mechanism moves to the second stage where the
proposer makes an offer composed of a social alternative that s/he wants to realize and monetary transfers
to the other individuals. Then, in the ﬁnal stage, the individuals other than the proposer sequentially reply
“to accept the offer” or “to reject it.” If the offer is unanimously accepted, the monetary transfers are
carried out and the proposed social alternative is realized. In the case where the offer is rejected by at least
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one individual, the monetary transfers are not carried out and the proposer’s most favorite alternative is
realized. We show that this multi-stage bidding mechanism works in any situation and always realizes a
socially efﬁcient alternative in any of its subgame perfect equilibria.
Finally, we discuss some applications of the bidding mechanism to the implementation of solutions
established in cooperative game theory and also suggest how we can rearrange these mechanisms in the
framework of collective choice problem we consider in the paper.
2 Bidding mechanism
Let N = f1; : : : ;ng be the set of n individuals. X is the ﬁnite set of social alternatives. We assume that each
individual’s utility functionUi is linearly separable with respect to money, i.e. there exists ui : X ! R such
that, for all (x;m) 2 X£R,
Ui(x;m) = ui(x)+m: (1)
For any i 2 N, let xi denote the individual i’s most favorite alternative, i.e. xi 2 argmax
x2X
fui(x)g. We deﬁne
a subset X f µ X as X f = fxi : i 2 Ng, i.e. the set of individuals’ most favorite alternatives. We consider the
social decision problem where we have to choose a single alternative among the feasible alternatives X . In
order to reconcile individuals’ conﬂicting interests and to determine a single socially best alternative, we
consider the following one-stage bidding mechanism:
i). Each individual i makes bids bi = (bi1; : : : ;b
i
i¡1;b
i
i+1; : : : ;b
i
n) 2 Rn¡1, one for each j 6= i.
ii). For each i, calculate a net bid Bi := å j 6=i bij¡å j 6=i b ji :
iii). An individual with the highest net bid becomes a proposer and obtain the right to determine
an alternative x¤ which is realized in the society in return for the actual payment of her/his bids
to the other individuals. If we have more than one individuals with the highest net bid, the
proposer is randomly chosen among them.
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The proposer is denoted by a , i.e. a 2 argmax
i2N
fBig. Obviously, in an equilibrium of this simple mechanism,
if exists, the proposer a chooses her/his most favorite alternative, i.e. x¤ = xa . Thus, the ﬁnal payment to
the proposer a is given as ua(xa)¡å j 6=a baj and the one to each j 6= a as u j(xa)+baj .
The one-stage bidding mechanism deﬁned above can be seen as a normal form game. We denote this
normal form game by B(N;X ;(Ui)i2N). We now examine a Nash equilibrium of this mechanism. The
following lemmata 1 and 2 show that we still have the same equilibrium properties as obtained in the
mechanism of Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [7].
Lemma 1. For any equilibrium strategy proﬁle (bi)i2N , every individual’s net bid must be zero, i.e. Bi = 0
for any i 2 N.
Proof. Let W := fi : Bi ¸ B j 8 j 2 Ng. If W = N, the fact that åi2N Bi = 0 trivially implies Bi = 0 for
each i 2 N. We now show that, for any equilibrium strategy proﬁle (bi)i2N , W= N follows. We prove this
by contradiction. Suppose that W µ N and W 6= N. Then, we can ﬁnd two distinct individuals i 2 W and
k 2NnW. Let d > 0, and consider the following proﬁle (bˆi)i2N such that bˆ j = b j 8 j 6= i, and bˆij = bij+d=jWj
if j 2 Wnfig ; bˆij = bij¡ d if j = k ; bˆij = bij otherwise. The new net bids are Bˆ j = B j¡ d=jWj 8 j 2 W;
Bˆk = Bk+ d ; Bˆ j = B j 8 j 2 Nn(W[fkg). Since B j > Bl holds for any j 2 W and any l 2 NnW, we still
obtain Bˆ j > Bˆl for sufﬁciently small d . Thus, Wˆ := fi : i= Bˆi ¸ Bˆ j 8 j 2 Ng completely coincides with W.
However, for the individual i, we have å j 6=i bˆij < å j 6=i bij, and thus, her/his new strategy bˆi increases her/his
expected ﬁnal payoff. ¥
Lemma 2. For any equilibrium strategy proﬁle (bi)i2N , each player receives the same ﬁnal payoff regard-
less of who becomes a proposer.
Proof. From Lemma 1, each individual’s net bid coincides with each other in the equilibrium. Thus, every
individual could become a proposer with the same probability. We prove the contrapositive of the lemma.
Suppose that some individual i could get the highest payoff in the case where s/he is a proposer than in
the case where some other individual is a proposer. Then, sufﬁciently small increases in her/his bids to
the other individuals improve her/his ﬁnal payoff so that s/he will deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
Similarly, if the individual i could obtain the highest payoff when some other individual j is a proposer than
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in the other cases, s/he has an incentive to decrease her/his bid to the individual j. ¥
The two lemmata have an important and somewhat undesirable implication about the existence of an
equilibrium of the one-stage mechanism. Let (bi)i2N be any equilibrium strategy proﬁle. We now demon-
strate that a strong condition on the individuals’ proposals is needed to ensure the existence of an equilib-
rium in the mechanism. From Claim 1, Bi must be zero for each i 2 N, or equivalently, we have
å
j 6=i
bij =å
j 6=i
b ji ; 8i 2 N; (2)
and thus every player could become a proposer with a strictly positive probability. Moreover, from Lemma
2, each player receives the same ﬁnal payoff regardless of who becomes a proposer. Therefore, for any two
distinct individuals j;k 2 N, the ﬁnal payoff to an individual i 6= j;k must be the same regardless of which
of the individuals, j and k, becomes a proposer:
ui(xk)+bki = ui(x
j)+b ji : (3)
And moreover, each player i is indifferent between the case where i her/himself becomes a proposer and
the case where some other player k is a proposer. Thus, by (2) and (3), we have the following:
ui(xk)+bki = ui(x
i)¡å
j 6=i
bij = ui(x
i)¡å
j 6=i
b ji = ui(x
i)¡
"
bki + å
j 6=i;k
¡
bki +ui(x
k)¡ui(x j)
¢#
= ui(xi)¡ (n¡1)bki ¡ (n¡2)ui(xk)+ å
j 6=i;k
ui(x j): (4)
Hence, we obtain nbki = å j2N ui(x j)¡ nui(xk) , and then the equilibrium bid by k to i must be uniquely
determined as follows:
bki =
1
n åj2N
ui(x j)¡ui(xk): (5)
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On the other hand, Lemma 1 tells that we have å j 6=i bij¡å j 6=i b ji = 0, 8i 2 N. Consequently, by (5), the
following two must be the same value:
å
j 6=i
bij =å
j 6=i
Ã
1
n åk2N
u j(xk)¡u j(xi)
!
; (6)
and
å
j 6=i
b ji =å
j 6=i
Ã
1
n åk2N
ui(xk)¡ui(x j)
!
: (7)
It is obvious that (6) and (7) are not always compatible with each other. From this observation, we obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If a bidding game B(N;X ;(Ui)i2N) has a Nash equilibrium, then the following condition
must hold:
å
k2N
uk(xi) = å
k2N
uk(x j); 8i; j 2 N: (8)
Proof. From (6) and (7), respectively, we have
å
j 6=i
bij =å
j 6=i
Ã
1
n åk2N
u j(xk)¡u j(xi)
!
=
1
n åj2N åk2N
u j(xk)¡ 1n åk2N
ui(xk)¡å
j 6=i
u j(xi); (9)
and
å
j 6=i
b ji =å
j 6=i
Ã
1
n åk2N
ui(xk)¡ui(x j)
!
=
n¡1
n åk2N
ui(xk)¡å
j 6=i
ui(x j): (10)
Substituting (9) and (10) into (2), we obtain the following:
å
i6= j
bij =å
j 6=i
b ji ,
1
n åj2N åk2N
u j(xk) = å
k2N
ui(xk)+å
j 6=i
u j(xi)¡å
j 6=i
ui(x j)
, 1
n åj2N åk2N
u j(xk) = å
j2N
u j(xi): (11)
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The LHS of the last equation is the constant determined independently of the individual i. Thus, the proof
is completed. ¥
Proposition 1 provides the necessary condition of the existence of an equilibrium of the bidding mecha-
nism B(N;X ;(Ui)i2N). It shows that there exists an equilibrium of the bidding mechanism B(N;X ;(Ui)i2N)
only in the case where each individual’s best alternative xi gives rise to the same sum of the individuals’
utilities, i.e. the condition (8). The next proposition shows that the converse assertion is also true, i.e. if the
bidding mechanism satisﬁes this condition then there exists an equilibrium in the mechanism.
Proposition 2. For any bidding game B(N;X ;(Ui)i2N) that satisﬁes the following condition:
å
k2N
uk(xi) = å
k2N
uk(x j); 8i; j 2 N;
there exists a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, under the above condition, the equilibrium bids are determined
by the equation (5) and the equilibrium payoff to i 2 N is given as:
1
n åk2N
ui(xk):
Proof. Let (bi)i2N be the proﬁle of the bids deﬁned in (5), i.e. bki =
1
n å j2N ui(x
j)¡ui(xk) 8i;k 2 N. We will
show that (bi)i2N is a Nash equilibrium. It is easy to verify that å j 6=i bij = å j 6=i b
j
i follows for any i; j 2 N,
i.e. the net bid Bi is equal 0 for each i 2 N, because åk2N uk(xi) = åk2N uk(x j) holds for all 8i; j 2 N.
Therefore, every individual could become a proposer with the same probability. We now show that each
individual’s ﬁnal payoff is the same regardless of who becomes a proposer. Fix an individual i arbitrarily.
If some other individual j becomes a proposer, the ﬁnal payoff to the individual i is
ui(x j)+b
j
i = ui(x
j)+
1
n åk2N
ui(xk)¡ui(x j) = 1n åk2N
ui(xk): (12)
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On the other hand, if the individual i her/himself becomes a proposer, s/he will gain
ui(xi)¡å
j 6=i
bij = ui(x
i)¡å
j 6=i
Ã
1
n åk2N
u j(xk)¡u j(xi)
!
= å
j2N
u j(xi)¡ 1n åk2N
Ã
å
j 6=i
u j(xk)+ui(xk)
!
+
1
n åk2N
ui(xk)
= å
j2N
u j(xi)¡ 1n
Ã
nå
j2N
u j(xk)
!
+
1
n åk2N
ui(xk) =
1
n åk2N
ui(xk) by (8). (13)
By the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2, every individual has no incentive to deviate from the
strategy proﬁle (bi)i2N .
As we have demonstrated, in any Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium bids are uniquely determined by
(5). By (12) and (13), the ﬁnal payoff to an individual i is given as 1n åk2N ui(x
k) for each i 2 N. ¥
From Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain the following characterization of the existence of an equilibrium
in the one-stage bidding mechanism.
Theorem 1. The bidding mechanism deﬁned as the normal form game B(N;X ;(Ui)i2N) has a Nash equi-
librium if and only if the following condition holds:
å
k2N
uk(xi) = å
k2N
uk(x j); 8i; j 2 N:
Under the assumption of quasi-linearity of individuals’ utility functions, we can deﬁne the following
efﬁciency property.
X f -efﬁciency: An alternative x 2 X f is said to be X f -efﬁcient if
å
k2N
uk(x)¸ å
k2N
uk(x j); 8 j 2 N:
From Theorem 1, we immediately obtain the following result.
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Corollary 1. In an equilibrium of the bidding mechanism B(N;X ;(Ui)i2N), the realized social alternative
x¤ = xa is X f -efﬁcient.
More generalized welfare property is also considered as follows.
Social efﬁciency: An alternative x 2 X is said to be socially efﬁcient if, for any y 2 X ,
å
k2N
uk(x)¸ å
k2N
uk(y):
As we have noted in the introduction, the social alternative realized in an equilibrium of the bidding
mechanism may fail to be socially efﬁcient. To make sure of this point, we give the following example.
Suppose that N = f1;2g, X = fx;y;zg, and
u1(x) = 4; u1(y) = 1; u1(z) = 3;
u2(x) = 1; u2(y) = 4; u2(z) = 3:
In this case, x1 = x and x2 = y, and åi2N ui(x1) = åi2N ui(x2) holds. Thus, either x or y is realized as an
equilibrium outcome of the mechanism. However, neither of them are socially efﬁcient because z gives rise
to åi2N ui(z) = 6> 5.
In this section, we examined the simple one-stage bidding mechanism and found that there are two
problems concerning this simple mechanism: one is that an equilibrium may fail to exist in general, and
the other is that an equilibrium outcome may not be socially efﬁcient even when an equilibrium of the
mechanism does exist. This motivates us to explore the mechanism which always works in any situation
and realizes a socially efﬁcient alternative. In the next section, we modify the one-stage bidding mechanism
and show that our modiﬁed mechanism works in any situation and realizes a socially efﬁcient alternative as
an equilibrium outcome.
11
3 Modiﬁed bidding mechanism
In the preceding section, we found that our simple one-stage mechanism can not always lead to an equilib-
rium. Moreover, this mechanism may fail to realize a socially efﬁcient alternative. In their paper, Pe´rez-
Castrillo and Wettstein [6] have successfully avoided the former problem, i.e. the non-existence of an equi-
librium, by the use of an extended strategy space.1 However, since their one-stage mechanism is designed
in the framework aimed at choosing a single proposal from all the individuals’ ones, not from all feasible
alternatives, the direct application of their one-stage mechanism in our model still fails to realize a socially
efﬁcient alternative in the case of the example we considered in the preceding section. In order to resolve
each of the two problems of our one-stage bidding mechanism, we modify the one-stage mechanism. Our
modiﬁed bidding mechanism proceeds in three stages:
Stage 1. The ﬁrst stage is similar to our one-stage mechanism. Each individual i makes a bid
bij 2R for each j 6= i, i.e. (bij) j 6=i 2Rn¡1. For each i, calculate a net bid Bi :=å j 6=i bij¡å j 6=i b ji :
A proposer a is randomly chosen among those with the highest net bid. The proposer a pays
her/his bid baj to each j 6= a .
Stage 2. The proposer a makes an offer composed of a social alternative x s/he wants to
realize and the payments (t j) j 6=a , i.e. (x;(t j) j 6=a) 2 X£Rn¡1. The payment t j is interpreted as
a transfer (resp. claim) to an individual j if it is positive (resp. negative).
Stage 3. Every individual other than a sequentially replies “to accept the offer” or “to reject
it.” If we have a rejection by at least one individual, the offer is rejected. Otherwise, the offer
is accepted. In the case of acceptance, the proposed alternative x is realized and the payment
t j is carried out between the proposer a and each j 6= a . If the offer is rejected, the payments
offered in Stage 2 are not carried out and xa is realized.
The only difference between the one-stage mechanism in the last section and the three-stage mechanism
deﬁned above is the monetary transfers offered in Stage 2 of the three-stage mechanism. In this three-stage
1In their one-stage bidding mechanism, each individual announces either of 1 or 0, interpreted as “really want” or “not,” as well
as her/his bids to the other individuals. Consequently, the strategy space of each individual becomes Rn¡1£f0;1g. A proposer is
randomly chosen among the individuals who have the highest net bid and announces 1. If the set of such individuals is empty, a
proposer is randomly chosen among the individuals with the highest net bid.
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mechanism, each individual receives the following ﬁnal payment:
an offer is accepted )
8>><>>:
a : ua(x)¡å j 6=a baj ¡å j 6=a t j
j 6= a : u j(x)+baj + t j;
(14)
an offer is rejected )
8>><>>:
a : ua(xa)¡å j 6=a baj
j 6= a : u j(xa)+baj :
(15)
For the modiﬁed bidding mechanism, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. There exists a subgame perfect equiribrium in the modiﬁed bidding mechanism. Moreover, in
any subgame perfect equilibrium, a socially efﬁcient alternative is realized.
Proof. First, we show that, in any subgame which starts at Stage 2, a socially efﬁcient alternative is realized
and each individual j 6= a receives a payoff equal to u j(xa) in any subgame perfect equilibrium. We
consider an optimal offer of a proposer a at Stage 2 who anticipates the actions of the other individuals at
Stage 3. It is obvious that each individual j 6= a accepts (resp. rejects) an offer (x; ti) if ui(x)+ ti > ui(xa)
(resp. ui(x)+ti < ui(xa)) in Stage 3. By the usual argument, each j 6=a is assumed to accept the offer (x; ti)
such that ui(x)+ ti = ui(xa).2 We distinguish two cases: xa is (i) socially efﬁcient, or (ii) not. In the case of
(ii), an optimal offer (x¤;(t¤i )i6=a) 2 X £Rn¡1 can be obtained as a solution of the following maximization
problem:
max
(x;(ti)i6=a )
ua(x)¡å
i 6=a
ti; s:t: ui(x)+ ti ¸ ui(xa); 8i 6= a: (16)
2To show that such an assumption is formally justiﬁed, it will be sufﬁcient to provide the following example. Consider the
following ultimatum offer game: ﬁrst, player 1 makes an offer (x1;1¡x1) of the distribution of the feasible payoff which amounts
to 1. Then, player 2 replies “accept it” or “not.” In the case of acceptance, the offer is realized. If the offer is rejected, both receive
zero, (0;0). It is obvious that the offer (1;0) and “accept any offer which gives 1¡x1 ¸ 0 to player 2” constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium. On the other hand, in the case of the rejection of the offer which gives 1¡ x1 = 0 to player 2, i.e. the rejection of
(1;0), such a strategy of player 2 never leads to a subgame perfect equilibrium because, provided that player 2 rejects the offer
(1;0), player 1 has an incentive to change the offer (1;0) to (x1;1¡ x1) with x1 2 (0;1) but s/he also wants to change the offer
(x1;1¡ x1) to (x01;1¡ x01) with x1 < x01 < 1, and thus any of the offers by player 1 can never be the best response to the strategy of
player 2. We can easily apply this observation to the case of sequential replies by multiple players (see, for example, Claim (b) in
Theorem 1 by Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [7]).
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Since an optimal offer (x¤;(t¤i )i6=a) must satisfy the constraint in (16) with equality for each i 6= a , the
optimal offer can be obtained as follows:
t¤i = ui(x
a)¡ui(x¤); 8i 6= a; (17)
x¤ 2 argmax
x2X åi2N
ui(x)¡å
i 6=a
ui(xa): (18)
By deﬁnition, such an offer is accepted by every other individual i 6= a . It is easily veriﬁed that this offer
is optimal for the proposer a . From (18), x¤ is a socially efﬁcient alternative. Because xa is socially
inefﬁcient, we have
å
i2N
ui(x¤)¡å
i2N
ui(xa)> 0 ) å
i2N
ui(x¤)¡å
i 6=a
ui(xa)> ua(xa): (19)
From (17), (19) can be rewritten as
ui(x¤)¡å
i 6=a
t¤i > ua(x
a): (20)
Therefore, from (20) and the fact that (x¤;(t¤i )i6=a) solves the problem (16), this offer is optimal for a . If we
have more than one solutions to (16), any of them is a optimal offer. In the case of (i), any of the optimal
offers deﬁned in (17) and (18) is still optimal for the proposer a . Note that, in this case, the inequality
in (19), thus also the one in (20), is replaced with equality. Thus, the payoff received by the proposer in
the subgame that starts at Stage 2 is equal to ua(xa). In addition to these offers, it is also optimal for the
proposer to announce an offer that gives the payoff strictly less than ui(xa) to some individual i. Such an
offer and the rejection by i at Stage 3 together also constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium in the subgame
that starts at Stage 2.
As seen in the above argument, in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the game that starts at Stage 2,
the social alternative realized as an equilibrium outcome of the game is always socially efﬁcient. Given the
subgame perfect equilibria in the subgame that starts at Stage 2, it follows from Theorem 1 that there exists
a Nash equilibrium in the truncated game at Stage 1. ¥
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Our multi-stage mechanism can always realize a socially efﬁcient alternative in its subgame perfect
equilibrium. The key is the monetary transfer offered in Stage 2, which leads a proposer a to offer a
socially efﬁcient alternative which may not be the most favorable one for the proposer. As shown in the
proof of Theorem 2, the surplus by such a conciliatory proposal is gained by the proposer through the
monetary transfers.
4 Applications and extensions
We now discuss some applications of the bidding mechanism to the implementation of solutions established
in cooperative game theory and also suggest how we can rearrange these implementation mechanisms in
the collective choice context we have considered in the preceding sections.
4.1 Weighted bidding game
Our modiﬁed bidding mechanism in the preceding section consists of the bidding stage and the subsequent
extensive form games where the individuals other than the proposer sequentially reveal “accept the offer”
or “reject it.” We now reformulate the mechanism in a more general form. For each i 2 N, let Di be an
arbitrary extensive form game which will be played in the case where the individual i becomes a winner of
the bidding stage. We write D= (Di)i2N . We denote the payoff to an individual j 2 N in a subgame perfect
equilibrium of Di by uij. Let w= (w1; : : : ;wn) 2 Rn++ be a positive weight on the individuals N. The multi-
stage mechanism considered in Section 3 can be generalized as the mechanism that consists of a weighted
bidding game and the subsequent extensive form game Da corresponding to the winner a determined in the
weighted bidding game. The weighted bidding mechanism G(N;w;D) is deﬁned as follows:
i). Each individual i makes a bid bij 2 R for each j 6= i, i.e. (bij) j 6=i 2 Rn¡1.
ii). For each i, calculate a weighted net bid Bi(w) := å j 6=iwibij¡å j 6=iw jb ji :
iii). An individual with the highest weighted net bid (if there exist more than one, randomly
chosen among them) is the winner of the bidding stage and only the winner actually pays
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her/his bids to the other players.
iv). The extensive form game Da corresponding to the winner a is played.
The ﬁnal payoff to an individual i 6= a in G(N;w;D) is the sum of the bid paid to i in the weighted
bidding stage and the payoff obtained in the subsequent game Da . On the other hand, the winner a receives
the payoff obtained in the game Da minus the total bids paid to the other individuals.
By the similar argument used to derive the equilibrium bid in (5) and Theorem 1 in Section 2, we
immediately obtain the following result.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the sum of the equilibrium payoffs (ui1; : : : ;u
i
n) in Di is the same for each i 2 N,
i.e.
å
k2N
uik = å
k2N
u jk; 8i; j 2 N:
Then, the equilibrium bids (bi¤)i2N in the weighted bidding stage are uniquely determined for the payoff
vector u=
¡
(u1j) j2N ; : : : ;(u
n
j) j2N
¢ 2 Rn2 as follows:
bij = å
k2N
wk
ål2N wl
ukj¡uij; 8i 2 N; 8 j 6= i;
and the equilibrium payoff to an individual i in G(N;w;D) is given as:3
å
k2N
wk
ål2N wl
uki :
Theorem 3 shows that, under the condition stated in the theorem, we can use the weighted bidding
game as a random device which selects a subsequent game Di. In the literature on the implementation
of cooperative solutions, random devices are used in many mechanisms. As stated in the theorem and
also observed in the preceding sections, the (weighted) bidding game not only randomizes the winner of
the game but also actually generates the payoffs equal to the expected ones in its equilibrium. Thus, the
(weighted) bidding game can be applied to implement cooperative solutions not in expected payoffs but
3In the case where we have other subgame paerfect equilibria generating another payoff vector v, we obtain the equilibrium
bids and the ﬁnal payoffs in the same way as for the case of u if v satisﬁes the condition of the theorem.
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in actually realized ones. In this respect, the bidding approach to the implementation mechanism has an
advantage to the other usual random device approaches.
4.2 Applications to implementing cooperative solutions
We now discuss some applications of the bidding mechanisms to the implementation of cooperative solu-
tions. The cooperative game theory mainly explores the allocation of the total amount of transferable utili-
ties which can be attained by individuals’ cooperation. A game in coalitional form with transferable utility,
or cooperative game, is a pair (N;v)where v : 2N !R is a characteristic function that measures the worth of
a coalition S µ N and v(S) represents the total amount of utility that the coalition S can obtain without any
cooperation by the members outside of S. It is usually assumed that v( /0) = 0. A solution f for a cooperative
game (N;v) is a function that associates with each game (N;v) a payoff vector f(N;v) = (fi(N;v))i2N 2Rn
under the feasibility constraint åi2N fi(N;v) 5 v(N). A solution f which always satisﬁes the feasibility
constraint with equality is said to be efﬁcient.
In what follows, we provide some examples each of which shows how we can apply the bidding
mechanism to implement a cooperative solution. The key is that, under a moderate condition such that
v(S)+v(fig)5 v(S[fig) for all Sµ N with i 62 S,4 the condition stated in Theorem 3 is most likely to hold
in the form that åk2N uik = v(N) for each i 2 N. The ﬁrst one is the implementation of the Shapley value
established by Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [7].
Example 1. Consider the following mechanism deﬁned in a recursive manner.
(i) If N is singleton, i.e. N = fig, the individual i obtains her/his value of stand-alone coalition, v(fig);
(ii) If jNj = 2, given that the mechanism is deﬁned for any k-person case with k < jNj, the following
mechanism is played by N:
Stage 1. The bidding game is played by N and an individual with the highest net bid (randomly
chosen if there exist more than one), say a , becomes a proposer and pays her/his bids to the
other players.
4This condition is usually called zero-monotonicity.
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Stage 2. The proposer a makes an offer of transfer p j 2 R to each of the other individuals.
Stage 3. Every individual other than a sequentially replies “to accept the offer” or “to reject
it.” If the offer is rejected by some individual, the offer is rejected. Otherwise, the offer is
accepted. In the case of acceptance, the transfer p j is carried out between the proposer a
and each of j 6= a and the proposer obtains the value of their cooperation v(N). If the offer is
rejected, the proposer a gains v(fag) and the individuals other than a , i.e. N nfag, play the
mechanism again.
This mechanism implements the Shapley value in its subgame perfect equilibrium.
To provide the outline of the proof will help understanding how we can apply the bidding mechanism
to the implementation of cooperative solutions. For any subset S µ N, we deﬁne the S-unanimity game
denoted by uS as: uS(T ) = 1 if T ¶ S; and uS(T ) = 0 otherwise. It is well known that any characteristic
function v is represented as a linear combination of the unanimity games such that v = åSµN;S 6= /0 dv(S)uS;
where dv(S) = åTµS(¡1)jSj¡jT jv(T ) for each Sµ N. The Shapley value Sh of a game (N;v) is deﬁned as:
Shi(N;v) = å
SµN;S3i
dv(S)
jSj ;
for any i 2 N. The proof proceeds by the induction on the number of the individuals. If N = fig, by the
deﬁnition of the mechanism, s/he obtains v(fig) = Shi(N;v). To prove the n-person case, suppose that a
payoff vector in any of the subgame perfect equilibria of the mechanism coincides with the Shapley value
for each case of jNj= t with 15 t 5 n¡1, and consider the case of jNj= n. Let a be a proposer determined
in Stage 1. In Stage 3, if some individual i 6= a rejects the offer made by a in Stage 2, by the induction
hypothesis, each individual j 6= a obtains her/his Shapley value of the game (N n fag;v). Then, by the
similar arguments to the proof of Theorem 2 and some weak condition on the characteristic function v
(e.g. zero-monotonicity), it can be shown that the subgame which starts from Stage 2 generates a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs such that each i 6= a obtains
Shi(N nfag;v)
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and the proposer a receives
v(N)¡å
i 6=a
Shi(N nfag;v) = v(N)¡ v(N nfag):
Therefore, letting uaj = Shi(N n fig;v) for each j 6= a and uaa = v(N)¡ v(N n fag) and also applying
Theorem 3, the equilibrium payoff to each individual i is given as:
v(N)¡ v(N nfig)
n
+
1
nåi 6= j
Shi(N nf jg;v): (21)
The value provided in (21) is the recursively represented Shapley value introduced by Maschler and Owen
[4].
Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [7] also showed that their mechanism with a slight extension implements
the weighted Shapley value.
Example 2. If we replace the bidding stage in the mechanism in Example 1 by the weighted bidding stage,
this new mechanism implements the weighted Shapley value Shw deﬁned as: for each i 2 N,
Shwi (N;v) = å
SµN;S3i
wi
å j2Sw j
dv(S):
We next provide the example of implementation of the weighted CIS (center of the imputation set)
value.5 The weighted CIS value is deﬁned as: for each i 2 N,
CISwi (N;v) =
wi
åk2N wk
Ã
v(N)¡å
j2N
v(f jg)
!
+ v(fig):
Example 3. We modify the mechanism in Example 1 in the following way: (i) the weighted bidding game is
played in Stage 1; and (ii) in the case of rejection in Stage 3, each i 2 N receives v(fig) and the mechanism
ends. This modiﬁed mechanism implements the weighted CIS value in its subgame perfect equilibrium.
By the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, under the appropriate condition such as v(N) ¸
5The CIS value has been originally deﬁned in Driessen and Funaki [1].
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å j2N v(f jg), the subgame which starts from Stage 2 generates a unique equilibrium payoff vector: for the
proposer a , v(N)¡å j 6=a v(f jg); and for each i 6= a , v(fig). Thus, applying Theorem 3, the ﬁnal payoff
vector must coincides with the weighted CIS value of (N;v).
Finally, we suggest the way to rearrange the mechanism of the above examples in the framework of the
collective choice problem we have discussed in the paper. Given a ﬁnite set of alternatives X , we deﬁne a
characteristic function vX associated with X as follows: for all Sµ N,
vX(S) =max
x2X åi2S
ui(x):6 (22)
By the deﬁnition of the characteristic function vX , the cooperative game deﬁned as (N;vX) may fail to be
zero-monotonic. Thus, to implement the cooperative solutions considered above, we need some slightly
ad hoc modiﬁcation in the mechanisms considered in the examples. To implement the (weighted) Shapley
value of (N;vX), the mechanisms in Examples 1 and 2 must be changed in the following way: (i) the
proposer a offers a social alternative x and a transfer t j to each j 6= a in Stage 2; (ii) in the case of
acceptance, the social alternative x is realized and transfer t j is carried out between a and each j 6= a;
and (iii) in the case of rejection, the proposer a faces with the worst outcome (e.g. expelled from the
society). With these modiﬁcation, each of the mechanisms in Examples 1 and 2 generates the subgame
perfect equilibrium payoffs Sh(N;vX) and Shw(N;vX), respectively. To implement the weighed CIS value,
in addition to the modiﬁcations (i) and (ii) above, we need to change (iii) as follows: in Stage 3, if an
individual j rejects the offer made in Stage 2, the individuals other than j face with their worst outcomes
and the individual j realizes her/his most favorite alternative x j.
5 Conclusion
We examined two alternative bidding mechanisms in the framework of collective choice of social alterna-
tives: one is the simple one-stage bidding mechanism, and the other is the multi-stage bidding mechanism.
6The characteristic function, vX , deﬁned in (22) is slightly different from those usually considered in the literature. vX (S) is
interpreted as the amount of total payoff the individuals in S can attain by themselves when the individuals outside of S leave the
society.
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There are two serious defects in the simple one-stage mechanism. There does not always exist an equi-
librium in the mechanism, and moreover, it may fail to generate a socially efﬁcient alternative even if an
equilibrium does exist. Our multi-stage bidding mechanism overcomes these two problems and always
realizes a socially efﬁcient alternative as an equilibrium outcome.
As seen in the present paper and also in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein [6], the bidding game actually
realizes the payoffs equal to the expected ones in its equilibrium. Thus, the bidding game can be said to be
an equitable random device in both ex ante and ex post criteria: an equal probability to be a proposer, and
the actually received payoffs equal to the expected ones, respectively. This property allows us to implement
cooperative solutions not in expected payoffs but in actually realized ones. Moreover, this equity property,
particularly the ex post equity, of the bidding mechanism is noteworthy in the context of collective choice
problem.
Finally, as we have seen in the last section, in the collective choice framework considered in the paper, it
is not easy to deﬁne the characteristic function that satisﬁes a moderate condition such as zero-monotonicity.
Consequently, in the context of the collective decision making of social alternatives, it is quite difﬁcult to
apply the existing mechanisms that implements the cooperative solutions satisfying an efﬁciency property
such as the Pareto efﬁciency. In this respect, the relevance of our multi-stage mechanism that always realizes
a socially efﬁcient alternative should be emphasized.
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